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REPLY TO PROFESSOR FINKIN
SAMUEL ESTREICHER*

Professor Matthew W. Finkin is an able, productive scholar in the
field and I appreciate the care and attention he has paid to my article.'
Without responding to each point of substance or tone in Professor
Finkin's commentary, I do think it useful to offer a few general observations by way of rejoinder.
I.
Professor Finkin does not clearly offer an affirmative view of his
own. I take it that he would approve of arbitration of disputes under
employment agreements entered into by sophisticated employees, but
would not enforce arbitration promises that extend to claims arising
under federal and state protective labor legislation. This is to be accomplished by a literal reading of Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) and cognate state laws to exclude all employment agreements
from their reach. Moreover, even for wholly contractual claims, he
would urge courts to ignore arbitration promises contained in standardform agreements, at least where the employees in questions can be considered "unsophisticated" and lacking some undefined level of bargaining
power. Apparently, courts will be able to embark on the latter program
even where they are unprepared to invalidate the agreements on grounds
of duress or unconscionability.
As my article hopefully makes clear, proper consideration of the
role of arbitration in employment disputes must address the role of external public policy and the problem of unsophisticated claimants. The
question, and I guess the central point of disagreement with Professor
Finkin, is how best to address these concerns. My view is that such concerns are best addressed by a combination of respect for the realm of
private contract (subject to the traditional grounds for voiding agreements) and accommodation of the public policies embodied in federal
and state protective labor laws.
Professor Finkin's position, in contrast, would substantially dampen
the willingness of firms to enter into arbitration agreements since arbitra* Professor of Law, New York University; Counsel, Cahill Gordon & Reindel.
I. Finkin, Commentary on "Arbitrationof Employment Disputes Without Unions," 66 CHI.KENT L. REV. 799 (1990).
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tion will hold out little promise of precluding de novo relitigation of the
underlying dispute in the civil courts. It is not clear that employeeclaimants as a class are better off under Professor Finkin's regime. Not
all claimants will be able to secure counsel to mount civil litigation or
will have equal claim on the limited resources of administrative agencies.
Even where counsel or administrative enforcement can be secured, the
delay and reputational costs of a public litigation may be less preferable
than a relatively quick, informal arbitration. This tradeoff is no less present in the case of unsophisticated claimants. Requiring resort to civil litigation in lieu of arbitration does not improve the lot of such claimants
unless one also ensures availability of counsel and assurance can be given
that delay and publicity costs are immaterial to the affected individuals.
Although Professor Finkin criticizes my account of the GardnerDenver line of cases, he does not affirmatively make out the case for his
insistence on "reserv[ing] public law questions for de novo judicial determination ... .-"2 Certainly, the National Labor Relations Board has traditionally taken a different view of arbitral competence. So has the
Supreme Court in a string of FAA rulings requiring arbitration of claims
under the federal antitrust, securities and racketeering laws. As developed more fully in the article, where arbitrators sit to resolve disputes
governed by public law, certain procedures are required to ensure that
these external policies are not disserved. Such procedures include exhaustion of applicable administrative filing requirements, a written award
and an accessible record of the proceedings, and judicial review of the
award for conformity with external law.
Does the FAA matter? A literal reading of the Section 1 exclusion
would certainly be a defensible outcome. It would, however, require
some repudiation of the prior ruling in Perry v. Thomas3 as well as an
interpretation divorced from the animating concern of the 1925 Congress
to exempt collective bargaining agreements. More importantly, such an
outcome would not resolve the underlying issue-whether, as a presumptive matter, the parties to an employment relationship can agree to arbitrate all claims arising out of that relationship, whether governed by state
or federal law. Professor Finkin assures us that this issue can still be
addressed by state courts in those jurisdictions that follow that Uniform
Arbitration Act. There are a number of problems with the suggestion,
not the least of which are the supremacy clause difficulties in having
some state courts decide whether their arbitration acts embrace claims
2. Id. at 808.

3. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
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arising under federal laws. Certainly, state courts would find it exceedingly difficult to implement the accommodation approach outlined in my
article. They are most likely to take the path of least resistance and preclude arbitration of federal-law claims. This resolution may please Professor Finkin, but it will purchased at the cost of discouraging arbitration
agreements.
II.
Professor Finkin offers an extended essay on the status of unilateral
contracts in an effort to persuade the reader that a meaningful line cannot be drawn between unilateral employer policies and bilateral employment agreements. My purpose in drawing the distinction was not to
suggest that arbitration clauses in unilateral policies are unenforceable
against employers while such policies are in effect. Rather, my argument
was that such policies are enforceable on grounds other than traditional
principles of contract law, and hence should not be read as "agreement[s]
in writing" within the meaning of the FAA and cognate state laws.
Courts that have enforced such unilateral employer policies have done so
in the absence of bargained-for consideration or employee reliance or
even awareness of the terms of such policies, and in the face of explicit
reservation of the power of unilateral modification or revocation. The
implications of my position are that arbitration clauses in such policies
should be confined to claims arising under those policies. Moreover, employers have a certain latitude in these unilateral promulgations to specify the procedure to be followed in the resolution of claims governed by
the policy.
Professor Finkin's purpose here is largely rhetorical. He is not seriously advocating the view that even in the case of sophisticated employees arbitration clauses in such unilateral promulgations could extend to
claims that have their source in some independent agreement or provision of state or federal external law.
A fully satisfactory theory for explaining the so-called "handbook
exception" to the employment-at-will doctrine has yet to be developed.
What is clear is that unilateral-contract theory, as conventionally understood, will not do the trick. That is certainly the view of the Supreme
Court of Michigan, the jurisdiction that in Toussaint4 first developed the
"handbook exception" to the employment-at-will doctrine. As that
court recently explained, in responding to a certified question from the
4. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980).
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Sixth Circuit in Bankey v. Storer BroadcastingCo. ,5 a unilateral-contract
theory is inconsistent with the initial recognition of a contractual obligation that arises "without mutual assent" and is subject to revocation
without such assent: "Under circumstances where 'contractual rights'
have arisen outside the operation of normal contractprinciples, the application of strict rules of contractual modification may not be appropriate."' 6 According to the Michigan high court, the employer is bound by
its unilateral policies because it derives a benefit from seeking "to promote an environment conducive to collective productivity"; it is not an
obligation derived from "the traditional contract-forming mechanisms of
mutual assent or individual detrimental reliance . . . .
Hence, even
without expressly reserving the power of unilateral revocation, when
"the employer changes its discharge-for-cause policy to one of employment-at-will, the employer's benefit is correspondingly extinguished, as is
the rationale for the court's enforcement of the discharge-for-cause
policy." 8
I believe that an analogy to administrative estoppel best explains this
line of cases. Perhaps there is better theory "out there." Despite Professor Finkin's valiant effort, what cannot be disputed is that the employer's
obligation falls "outside the operation of normal contract principles."
Professor Finkin further suggests that the unilateral promulgation
by the employer of a for-cause limitation on discharge necessarily requires a de novo adjudication in the civil courts, with appropriate deference given to an internal-dispute resolution mechanism that terminates
before a "truly neutral external adjudicator." 9 No authority is offered in
support of this proposition. There is a vast gulf between this conclusion
and the illusory-promise scrutiny with which Professor Finkin begins the
discussion. This is, moreover, paternalism without purpose. In a context
where courts recognize an implied power in the employer unilaterally to
modify or even revoke the for-cause limitation, judicial adoption of Professor Finkin's suggestion would fairly swiftly result in widespread revocation. Again, who gains by insisting on such an either-or choice?
"7

III.
In my section on the "Company Union Objection," I suggested that
5. 432 Mich. 438, 443 N.W.2d 112 (1989).
6. Id. at 447-48, 443 N.W.2d at 116 (emphasis supplied). Professor Finkin authorizes me to
note that he believes that the Bankey decision represents a judicial "failure of nerve."
7. Id. at 454, 443 N.W.2d at 119.
8. Id.
9. Finkin, supra note 1, at 811.

1990]

REPLY TO FINKIN

nothing in our federal labor laws bars employers from using employees as
members of an internal adjudicative body or from giving employees the
choice of either representing themselves or taking advantage of an employee-advocate, whether chosen from the employee's ranks or management. While conceding that the former might be permissible, Professor
Finkin maintains that the use of employee-advocates runs afoul of the
prohibition of employer-dominated or -assisted "labor organizations" in
section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act. Unfortunately, Professor Finkin offers no authority directly on point in support of his fairly
aggressive formulation of the "institutional autonomy" interpretation of
section 8(a)(2). The dearth of authority is telling in view of the rather
widespread use of employee-counselors in many of the nonunion systems
referenced in footnotes 5 through 7 of my article. The fragments of legislative history marshalled by Professor Finkin simply have been taken out
of context to suggest that the use of employee-advocates, standing alone,
violates the section 8(a)(2) prohibition. One such instance is quoted in
full in the margin to indicate that what the labor movement was objecting to was a "form of collective bargaining" without unions.10
10. Concerning the Chrysler Corporation plan referenced in footnote 66 of Professor Finkin's
commentary, supra note 1, William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, testified:
The route outlined for the adjustment of any matter which in the opinion of any employee
of the company requires adjustment is:
(1) To the foreman in charge of the work;
(2) To the employee representative of his voting district who takes it up again with
the foreman;
(3) To the management's special representative who will help the employee representative and the foreman prepare a joint statement to be taken up with(4) The foreman's superior officers;
(5) To the joint council who may call the employee before it to give information regarding the matter under consideration and may go in a body with the management's
special representative to any part of the plant to make an investigation "after making
arrangements for so doing with the management's special representative." After complete investigation and full discussion, the joint council votes. The employees['] representatives and the management's representatives have equal voting power and a twothirds vote is necessary to reach a decision. If a decision is not reached by the joint
council at the second meeting following the meeting at which the case was first
brought up, the matter goes(6) To the president of the company, who may confer with the joint council or any
committee or any group of employee representatives. Within 10 days he must propose
a settlement or refer the matter to(7) Arbitration; this consists of an employee representative selected by the employee
members of the joint council, the president himself, and an impartial and disinterested
arbitrator selected by these two. If the president and the employees' representative
cannot agree upon an arbitrator, each selects one. If these two arbitrators agree, their
decision is final. If they do not agree within 20 days, they select and call in a third
arbitrator, and a decision of a majority of these three shall be binding in the matter.
It has been estimated by an officer of the compliance division of the W.R.A. that this
procedure would occupy at least 100 days after the employee originally presented a matter
for adjustment. Note, too, that at every stage of the procedure representatives of manage-
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IV.
I end on a point of mood. For a variety of reasons, the labor movement is in decline in this country. Some of the causes of decline are
correctable by legislation; some derive from structural changes in the
workforce and the implications of a system of decentralized, competitive
labor relations. Whatever one's views on that larger question, however, I
would urge that the proper legal treatment of arbitration of individual
employment disputes should be considered on its own terms.

ment are present, exercising that subtle control over decisions which is inherent in the
power to pay and the power to discharge.
SENATOR DAVIS: From hearing the statements that you are making, Mr. Green, I
take it for granted that you are opposing that form of collective bargaining?
MR. GREEN: Senator, I could be arrested for what I think about it and for what I
would like to say about it.
I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 125-26 (Commemorative ed.
1985).

